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Abstract: According to content externalism, the content of our 
thought is partly determined by the linguistic environment respon-
sible for it. However, there is growing skepticism about the com-
patibility of content externalism and self-knowledge. The skeptical 
position holds that, if content externalism is true, then we cannot 
know our own thought content because we would not be able to 
discriminate it from relevant alternative thought contents. This ar-
gument rests on the proposition that knowledge requires some type 
of discriminability. In this paper, I argue that this requirement does 
not apply to a particular type of demonstrative thoughts, more 
specifically, that in a typical case where we demonstratively denote 
an object without taking it as anything in particular, our second-
order judgment about our own thinking, whose content includes 
this use of a demonstrative, constitutes knowledge without due dis-
criminability. 
Keywords: Content externalism; demonstrative thought; discrimina-
bility; indefinite use of demonstratives; self-knowledge. 
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1. Introduction 
 Content externalism claims that the content of our thought is deter-
mined in part by our external environments. The classic argument for con-
tent externalism is inspired by Hilary Putnam (1975)’s famous Twin Earth 
thought experiment. Imagine that in remote place in the galaxy there is 
a planet where everything is the same as Earth except that, instead of wa-
ter, it contains a substance exactly similar to but chemically different from 
water. We may call this substance twater, which is composed of XYZ, as 
opposed to H2O. When a normal inhabitant of Earth utters a sentence con-
taining the word ‘water,’ she thereby expresses a thought about H2O. For 
instance, when she says, ‘Water is wet,’ she naturally expresses a thought 
whose content is that water is wet. Therefore, her utterance would be true 
if and only if H2O is wet. On the other hand, if her Twin Earth counterpart 
utters the same sentence, she would express a thought whose content is that 
twater is wet. This utterance would be true if and only if XYZ is wet. Given 
that the inner states of the two persons are exactly the same when they 
utter the sentence, it follows that the mental contents of their intentional 
states are not solely determined by the intrinsic properties of their cognitive 
mechanism. 
 Although content externalism has recently gained popularity, many phi-
losophers have worried about a skeptical view which asserts that the doc-
trine of content externalism is incompatible with a natural assumption 
about self-knowledge: that we can know a priori (or “from the armchair”) 
the contents of our own thoughts without investigating our environment 
pertinent to them. One version of this skepticism is established by relating 
knowledge to some type of discriminatory ability. With some stipulation, 
the earthian of the aforementioned Twin Earth case does not seem to be 
able to discriminate a priori her occurrent thought content (that water is 
wet) from the alternative thought content (that twater is wet). Provided 
that knowledge requires some type of discriminatory ability, the skeptic 
may argue that she does not know a priori her occurrent thought content. 
The reasoning behind the skepticism can be represented by an argument as 
follows: 
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(DA1) If content externalism is true, we cannot discriminate a priori our 
occurrent thought content from any relevant alternative thought con-
tent. 
(DA2) If we cannot discriminate a priori our occurrent thought content 
from any relevant alternative thought content, then we do not know 
a priori our occurrent thought content. 
Conclusion. If content externalism is true, we do not know a priori our 
occurrent thought content. 
 Let us call this the discrimination argument. Many philosophers have 
argued against it to establish the compatibility of content externalism and 
self-knowledge.1 The strategies of compatibilists tend to move in two direc-
tions: either they show that content externalism, despite the worries stem-
ming from the discrimination argument, does not fail the discriminatory 
ability, or they show that knowledge does not require an ability to discrim-
inate the occurrent thought content and any alternative content.2 Quite 
a number of compatibilists take the former direction, as it seems pressing 
that knowledge requires some type of discriminatory ability. A classic ex-
ample that illustrates the discriminability requirement is given by Alvin 
Goldman (1976, 772–73). Henry is driving in an area which has many barns 
and papier-mâché facsimiles looking just like barns. Without knowing that 
some of them are facsimiles, he points to an object, which happens to be 
a real barn, and says, “That’s a barn.” Although he correctly identifies the 
object, he does not seem to know that it is a barn. The most natural expla-
nation for his failure of knowledge is that he could not tell the object at 
hand from other fake barns, and thus would still believe that he was seeing 
a real barn even if the target object were a fake barn. This example suggests 
that an ability to discriminate an external object from other alternative 
objects is required for perceptual knowledge. Though this example purports 
to establish the discriminability requirement for perceptual knowledge, 
                                                 
1  For some influential works on this issue, see (Bar-on 2004; Boghossian 1989; 
Brown 2004; Brueckner 1990; Burge 1988; Falvey and Owens 1994; McKinsey 1991; 
McLaughlin and Tye 1998; Parent 2017). 
2  Here the first and the second strategies amount to rejecting the first and the 
second premises of the discrimination argument, respectively. 
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some people might argue that the same applies to knowledge of our thought 
contents. Those compatibilists who accept this view are bound to endorse 
(DA2), while remaining opposed to (DA1). 
 This type of strategy often appeals to the notion of relevance. According 
to this strategy, if content externalism is granted, we can discriminate a pri-
ori our occurrent thought from other alternative thoughts, as long as the 
alternatives are relevant. Thus, earthians can normally discriminate a priori 
the thought that water is wet from the thought that gin is wet or that 
petroleum is wet, insofar as they live in linguistic environments where the 
gin- or petroleum-involved thoughts are widely available. Someone may not 
be able to discriminate his or her thought content that water is wet from 
the putative alternative content that twater is wet, but for anyone in nor-
mal circumstances this alternative content is irrelevant. In other words, 
unlike Henry’s case, the situation where someone is thinking that twater is 
wet, as described in the beginning of this section, is not a relevant alterna-
tive to the situation where a normal earthian is thinking that water is wet. 
 Many commentators, however, agree that “the slow switch” case pro-
vides a scenario where the twater-involved content is a legitimately relevant 
alternative to a normal water-involved content (Burge 1988, 652–53; 
Boghossian 1989, 13; Falvey and Owens 1994, 111–12; Brown 2004, 39–40). 
Imagine that Sally, a fellow earthian, unwittingly traveled to Twin Earth. 
She resided long enough to replace her old concept of water with the new 
concept of twater shared by the indigenous inhabitants.3 Assuming the 
truth of content externalism, her utterance ‘water is wet’ now expresses the 
content that twater is wet. Suppose she has unwittingly traveled back and 
forth between the two planets a number of times, and at each stay, she 
spent sufficient time to switch the concepts involving water or twater.  
                                                 
3  It is widely accepted that the concept someone has retained in one linguistic 
environment, whether it is the concept of water or of twater, will be replaced by the 
other if he or she stayed long enough in the other environment and engaged in 
communicational activities using the concept along with the fellow members of the 
linguistic community. It may be debatable whether the new concept supersedes or 
supplements the old concept. But I will not press the issue here. It suffices to say 
that the water- or twater-related concept he or she retains at each stay would differ 
from the concept retained in the previous stay of the other environment. 
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Under these circumstances, if she resides in earth and forms an occurrent 
belief that water is wet, then the thought that twater is wet is a relevant 
alternative, because considering her itinerant history between the two plan-
ets, she could have been on Twin Earth thinking that twater is wet. Nev-
ertheless, since Sally is unaware of her trips, she would sincerely believe 
that the thought she currently has by entertaining the content of ‘water is 
wet’ is the same as the thought she had by entertaining the content of the 
same sentence earlier while she was (unwittingly) staying on Twin Earth. 
Then, Sally seems to lack the ability to discriminate a priori between her 
occurrent thought that water is wet and a relevant alternative thought that 
twater is wet. In sum, in the slow switch case, the twater-thought can rea-
sonably be considered a relevant alternative to the water-thought, but the 
subject is not able to discriminate one from the other.4 
 This type of example is threatening to those who attempt to reject the 
incompatibility of content externalism and self-knowledge, as specified in 
(DA1). A number of philosophers have attempted to get round the problem 
raised by the slow switch case. On the other hand, we may question the 
truthfulness of the discriminability requirement as specified in (DA2). As 
we have seen, (DA2) states that knowledge of our thought content requires 
some type of discriminatory ability. Hence, we can still refute the discrimi-
nation argument by showing that we can know a priori our occurrent 
thought content without being able to discriminate it with relevant alter-
native contents. Kevin Falvey and Joseph Owens (1994, 109 ff), for exam-
ple, distinguish what they call introspective knowledge of content, which 
                                                 
4  Peter Ludlow (1995) offers a less fancy example of this sort. There may be actual 
cases where the denotation of a word can be switched to a similar, albeit distinct, 
kind of object in a different linguistic community—a kind of object deemed internally 
identical to the subject. For instance, an international traveler may entertain a tho-
ught containing the word ‘chicory’ in England, and then move to the United States 
and entertain the corresponding thought that contains the same word, while unaware 
that the contents of her thoughts in the two occasions differ from each other. This 
view is sometimes referred to as social externalism. Though I do not discuss the slow 
switching cases involving social externalism in this paper, my argument here can 
faithfully be applied to the skepticism of self-knowledge stemming from social exter-
nalism as well. For a criticism of social externalism, see (Pollock 2015). 
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involves whether you can epistemically access your occurrent thought con-
tents directly and authoritatively, from what they call introspective 
knowledge of comparative content, which involves whether or not you can 
tell the difference between any pair of your occurrent thought contents di-
rectly and authoritatively. According to their argument, the slow switch 
case cannot be tenably applied to the former kind of self-knowledge.5 In this 
paper, I aim to offer a novel explanation for why the sort of discriminatory 
ability that concerns content externalism is not required to establish self-
knowledge of our occurrent thought content when focusing on a particular 
type of using demonstratives. My argument depends on the notion that we 
cannot possibly misidentify a target object when we refer to it with 
a demonstrative expression without attributing any particular identifica-
tory property to it. I first build up an argument for a version of the dis-
crimination argument that appeals to a principle of thought individuation 
suggested by Gareth Evans. Then, I contend that the distinctive feature in 
the aforementioned use of demonstratives undermines this argument, which 
reveals the untenability of the discriminability requirement. Finally, I re-
spond to a possible objection to my argument, which claims that even 
demonstrative denotation allows room for misidentification. 
2. An argument for the discriminability requirement 
 Bertrand Russell famously distinguished knowledge by acquaintance 
from knowledge by description. As a classical foundationalist, Russell held 
that knowing a proposition must eventually depend on acquaintance with 
the relevant particulars. In defense of this view, he said that “it is scarcely 
conceivable that we can make a judgement or entertain a supposition with-
out knowing what it is that we are judging or supposing about” (Russell 
1912, 58). Evans gives an interesting interpretation of this remark to estab-
lish a substantial principle about individuating thoughts. While dubbing it 
Russell’s Principle, Evans understands this remark as stating that thinking 
                                                 
5  For a different approach that rejects the discriminability requirement, see 
(Goldberg 2005 and 2006). 
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about an object requires us to possess the ability to discriminate it from 
anything else. He writes: 
In order to make Russell’s Principle a substantial principle, I shall 
suppose that the knowledge which it requires is what might be 
called discriminating knowledge: the subject must have a capacity 
to distinguish the object of his judgment from all other things. 
(Evans 1982, 90) 
It may be debatable whether Evans correctly interprets Russell’s view here. 
Nevertheless, Evans seems to impose a quite sensible requirement for the 
individuation of singular thoughts. We can encapsulate the requirement as 
follows: 
 (E) If S is thinking (or making a judgment) about x, then S can dis-
criminate x from any object other than x. 
 With regard to (E) and the discrimination argument, compatibilists 
might hope that, by satisfying (E), we may be able to discriminate a priori 
between the actual scenario where we have an occurrent thought, and rele-
vant alternative scenarios where we are thinking alternative thoughts, in-
cluding the Twin Earth analogue of the actual occurrent thought. (E) states 
that the discriminatory ability is a necessary condition for a subject to think 
about an object x. Let the content of the actual occurrent thought be rep-
resented by the form: x is F. Given the truth of (E), if we think x is F, then 
we must have the discriminatory ability between x and any other object, 
including an exact duplicate of x (call it y). Then, it may be suggested that 
if (E) is true, then by thinking that x is F, we must be able to discriminate 
a priori between the actual scenario where we are thinking that x is F and 
any other scenarios where we would be thinking different thoughts, includ-
ing an alternative scenario where we are thinking that y is F. 
 However, this view is vulnerable to a counterexample. Suppose I am 
witnessing a seemingly supernatural phenomenon featuring a UFO. A sau-
cer-shaped aircraft appears in the sky, flies in irregular patterns, and then 
quickly disappears from my sight. Suppose also that, unbeknownst to me, 
there is another flying object in the vicinity qualitatively identical to the 
saucer that I witnessed. Let us call the two aircrafts U1 and U2: U1 is the 
one that I witnessed and U2 is the one in the vicinity. At t1, while looking 
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at U1, I think to myself, ‘That moves fast.’ Then, without my noticing, U1 
is switched to U2. After a while (at t2), upon looking at U2, I think, ‘That 
moves fast,’ taking myself to be thinking about the same object. At this 
point, I seem to satisfy (E) both at t1 and at t2. At t1 I stand in a certain 
perceptual relation to U1, by virtue of which I visually identify U1 and place 
it at a certain location. Thus, I successfully refer to U1 within my represen-
tational system, where no other relevant alternative objects, including U2, 
exist in that system at t1. So, I am thinking about U1 at t1, and not about 
anything else. In the same way, at t2 I visually identify U2 and place it at 
a certain location. So, I successfully refer to U2 within my representational 
system, which does not contain any other relevant alternative objects, in-
cluding U1 at that time. Hence, it is true for me that I am thinking about 
U2 at t2 and not about anything else. However, by stipulation of my thought 
experiment, I am unable to distinguish between U1 and U2. In particular, 
I cannot discriminate a priori between the content of the thought I had at 
t1 that that (U1) moves fast and the content of the thought I had at t2 that 
that (U2) moves fast.6 On being asked, I would sincerely answer that I was 
thinking the same proposition on both occasions. Thus, this case illustrates 
that we can distinguish the object of our occurrent thought from any other 
object, while remaining unable to discriminate the content of our occurrent 
thought from any relevant alternative contents. In particular, we can think 
a perceptual demonstrative thought about an object x (‘That (x) is F’), 
while remaining unable to distinguish it from a relevant alternative thought 
about y (‘That (y) is F’), where x ≠ y. 
                                                 
6  Here I follow Jessica Brown (2004, 86–89), except that Brown mentions that the 
subject would not be able to discriminate between her current situation where she 
thinks a perceptual demonstrative thought and a relevant alternative situation where 
she thinks the twin analogue of the demonstrative thought (Brown 2004, 89). This 
is clearly mistaken: in general, people can distinguish their current experiences from 
phenomenologically identical experiences occurring at different times. To rectify the 
mistake, here I refer to the discriminatory ability between two tokens of thoughts, as 
opposed to two different situations, occurring at different times: I am unable to 
distinguish between my thought that that (U1) moves fast, occurring at a certain 
time, and the relevant alternative thought I am thinking that that (U2) moves fast, 
occurring at a later time. 
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 The preceding observation reveals that satisfying Evans’s requirement 
for thinking about an object—namely, securing an ability to discriminate 
between the currently perceived object and any other object—does not en-
tail the ability to discriminate between occurrent thought content and other 
relevant alternative contents. Hence, compatibilists would not be successful 
in using (E) to cope with the discrimination argument. Nevertheless, they 
may claim that (E) can be revised to secure the basis for a special kind of 
self-knowledge. 
 To demonstrate this point, let us note that (E) concerns our thought 
about an object: it aims to show that thinking of a particular object requires 
an ability to distinguish it from any other object. Compatibilists may argue 
that thinking of our own thought contents, as opposed to thinking of exter-
nal objects, gives rise to an interesting result. Tyler Burge (1988) famously 
argues that what he calls basic self-knowledge is self-verifying. According to 
him, basic self-knowledge consists of judgments of the following form: 
S judges that S is thinking that p. Burge goes on to claim that, when a per-
son thinks (or judges) that she is thinking that p, she is thereby entertaining 
the thought content that p. Entertaining (the content) that p is a type of 
thinking that p. Thus, by judging that she is thinking that p, she is indeed 
thinking that p. In other words, when we think: 
 (*)  I am thinking that p,  
by entertaining the content (*), we thereby make (*) true. Thus, when we 
make a judgment about our thinking a particular content, our judgment is 
self-verifying. 
 On the Burgean approach, this type of first-person introspective judg-
ment is applicable to the aforementioned slow switch case. Suppose Sally, 
while on Earth, makes this type of first-person judgment when she thinks 
that water is wet. Then, we would report her thought by saying that she 
judges that she is thinking that water is wet. In expressing this judgment, 
she entertains the thought that water is wet, and thereby is thinking that 
water is wet. She cannot falsely believe, for example, that she is thinking 
that twater is wet. The same point applies to the case where Sally is on 
Twin Earth. When she thinks, ‘I am thinking that water is wet,’ she makes 
the judgment that she is thinking that twater is wet. In making this  
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judgment, she entertains the thought that twater is wet, and thereby is 
thinking that twater is wet. Her current aquatic environments render it the 
case that she cannot falsely be engaged in the water-thought. This shows 
that Sally cannot be mistaken about her cogito thoughts. 
 Can the Burgean approach to the self-verifying nature of basic self-
knowledge shed light on the compatibility of content externalism and self-
knowledge? In my view, the skeptic may use Evans’s requirement to argue 
that the discrimination argument still stands with respect to second-order 
first-person judgments of our own thought contents. (E) states that think-
ing of an object requires some type of discriminability. Likewise, the skeptic 
may suggest that thinking a second-order judgment regarding our own 
thought from the first-person perspective requires the ability to discriminate 
between our occurrent thought content and relevant alternative contents, 
including the twin analogue of the occurrent thought. We can articulate 
this proposition as follows: 
 (E′)  If S thinks that S is thinking that p, then S can discriminate 
a priori between S’s occurrent thought that S is thinking that 
p and any relevant alternative thought that S is thinking that 
q (where p ≠ q). 
Apart from this, we can naturally assume that knowledge of a particular 
proposition entails thinking about its content. Hence, it is reasonable to 
accept the following principle. 
 (K)  If S knows a priori that S is thinking that p, then S thinks 
that S is thinking that p.7 
Applying simple rules of propositional logic to (K) and (E′), we can derive: 
 (DA2′) If S cannot discriminate a priori between S’s occurrent 
thought that S is thinking that p and any relevant alternative 
thought that S is thinking that q (where p ≠ q), then S does 
not know a priori that S is thinking that p. 
                                                 
7  Here I intend that (K) is restricted to our occurrent thought. Surely, when 
I know that a particular proposition is true, I need not concurrently entertain its 
content. 
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This principle states that knowledge also requires discriminatory ability in 
terms of second-order judgments of our own thought contents. The initial 
slow switch case is put forward to illustrate that content externalism is 
incompatible with securing due discriminability in terms of ordinary first-
order judgments about an object. The skeptic might argue that the same is 
true of introspective second-order judgments about our own thought con-
tents. In the aforementioned slow switch case where Sally judges that she 
is thinking that water/twater is wet, we noted that we would report her 
judgment differently depending on whether she makes the judgment on 
Earth or on Twin Earth. Hence, the two tokens of the introspective second-
order judgments are distinct from each other. However, by the stipulation 
of the story, Sally would not be able to tell the difference. If asked about 
the identity of the two judgment tokens, she would sincerely answer that 
she made exactly the same judgment both times (or so we can stipulate the 
story). Sally lacks the discriminatory ability as to the introspective second-
order judgments about her own thought contents. We can recapitulate this 
point as follows: 
 (DA1′) If content externalism is true, then S cannot discriminate 
a priori between S’s occurrent thought that S is thinking that 
p and any relevant alternative thought that S is thinking that 
q (where p ≠ q). 
From (DA1′) and (DA2′), we can easily draw the conclusion about the 
incompatibility of content externalism and self-knowledge involving the sec-
ond-order judgments of our own thought contents. 
 This may sound unfavorable for compatibilists. Quite the contrary, how-
ever, I think that the preceding observation opens a possibility for them to 
reject the discrimination argument. Let us first note that (DA2′) is an in-
stance of (DA2): while (DA2) concerns the discriminatory ability involving 
any type of thought, (DA2′) concerns the discriminatory ability on a special 
type of thoughts—namely, the ability to discriminate among second-order 
judgments concerning our own thought contents. It means that the sound-
ness of the discrimination argument as suggested in the beginning of this 
paper entails the soundness of this particular version of the argument. Then, 
since (DA2) entails (DA2′), compatibilists can reject (DA2) by successfully 
12  Huiyuhl Yi 
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refuting (DA2′), and if (DA2) is rejected, then the discrimination argument 
collapses. 
 Compatibilists may refute (DA2′) by disproving either (E′) or (K). (K) 
seems indisputable. However, I think that (E′) can be disproven. In what 
follows, I argue that a standard case where we have a second-order judg-
ment regarding our own perceptual demonstrative thought and in which we 
do not attribute any identificatory property to the referent, constitutes 
a counterexample to (E′). In addition, I argue that this sort of case, due to 
a characteristic feature of this use of demonstrative thoughts, can be used 
to show that (DA2′) is vulnerable to counterexamples as well. 
3. Demonstrative thoughts and the discrimination  
argument 
 As the first step, I would like to note a distinctive feature of demon-
strative thoughts. In thinking a demonstrative thought, we do not neces-
sarily take the object at hand as some particular thing. For instance, when 
I look at a peach in a fruit store and think, ‘That looks delicious,’ my use 
of the demonstrative may denote the peach without attributing any iden-
tificatory property to it. I may unwittingly have seen the peach before, 
and I might even have thought that it looked unpalatable at that time. 
However, as long as I do not remember these facts, I am taking it as some 
peach or other in my occurrent thought. When we demonstratively denote 
a perceived object without taking it as some particular thing, I would like 
to call it the indefinite use of a demonstrative expression. In employing 
the indefinite use of demonstratives, we are guaranteed to correctly refer 
to the intended object. For instance, when I see a tree and think, ‘That 
is an elm,’ I cannot possibly be mistaken because of misidentification. 
Of course, I may be erroneous because I falsely ascribe a certain property 
to the object—e.g., the tree may be a beech. However, in that case, the 
reason why I am mistaken is not because I misidentify the object. My 
use of the demonstrative correctly picks out the intended object. It is just 
that the correctly identified object lacks the property I ascribe to it. 
In general, when we indefinitely use a demonstrative to denote a perceived 
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object, we are bound to be free of error in identifying the object at  
hand.8 
 The indefinite use of demonstratives contrasts with the definite use. In 
employing the definite use, we take the object as some particular thing. 
This usage allows us to misidentify the object. Suppose I am watching races 
in a track meet in which my daughter participated. From a distance, I see 
that a girl, who dresses like my daughter, wins a race. Thinking that she is 
my daughter, I may proudly shout to the person next to me, “That’s my 
girl!” Here, I am taking the girl as a particular person (namely, my daugh-
ter), and thus, there is a sense in which I may be mistaken in identifying 
the object I intend to identify.9 However, insofar as we engage in the indef-
inite use of a demonstrative and do not take the object as anything (or 
anyone) in particular, there is no room for us to be mistaken in referring to 
the intended object.10 
 My contention is that a typical case where we are engaged in the indef-
inite use of a demonstrative amounts to a counterexample to (E′) and to 
                                                 
8  I do not mean to suggest that, in employing the indefinite use of a demonstrative 
expression, we can never be mistaken in presuming that the referent in fact exists. 
We can surely demonstratively refer to a hologram projection of a car, falsely be-
lieving that we are seeing a real car. I only want to claim that, in referring to an 
object with the indefinite use, what we intend to refer to must be identical to what 
we actually refer to. 
9  Even in this case, there are two senses as to how we intend to identify an object. 
See my discussion of two different interpretations of intended objects in the next 
section. 
10  It may be doubted whether the indefinite use of a demonstrative is possible, 
given that demonstratives are context-dependent. For instance, drawing upon the 
Kaplanian approach to indexicals, someone might claim that the same demonstrative 
expression uttered in different contexts may convey different contents, though have 
the same character; but a demonstrative should always be definite in a given context. 
However, in my usage of the term, whether a demonstrative expression is used inde-
finitely or definitely depends on the epistemic attitude of the subject; and it is surely 
possible for us to demonstratively refer to an object, and not anything else, in a given 
context, while at the same time not regarding the object as anything in particular. 
Therefore, my understanding of the indefinite use of a demonstrative is compatible 
with the Kaplanian picture. I thank Jihee Han for helping me clarify this point. See 
(Kaplan 1989) for the details of the Kaplanian view of indexicals. 
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(DA2′) altogether. To illustrate this point, consider a variation of the afore-
mentioned UFO example. There are two aircrafts, U1 and U2, in the vicinity 
of the sky I am observing. But this time I do not observe one craft after the 
other. I only watch U1 and think, ‘That moves fast.’ Though I did not see 
U2, under the circumstances, U2 could have been in the place of U1 at the 
exact moment when I witness U1, and could have flied and disappeared 
exactly the way U1 did. If that had happened, let us suppose, I would have 
thought to myself, ‘That moves fast.’ So, there are two tokens of demon-
strative thoughts expressed by the sentence, one actual and the other coun-
terfactual. Let us call the actual and the counterfactual thought contents 
p and q, respectively. According to content externalism, p and q are tokens 
of two different thoughts, since p stands for a thought about U1 while 
q stands for a thought about U2. Now, suppose that while looking at U1, 
I introspectively make a judgment, ‘I am thinking that that moves fast.’ 
Then, we would report my second-order judgment by saying that I think 
that I am thinking that p. Let us stipulate that if I had witnessed U2 instead, 
I would have formed the corresponding second-order introspective judgment 
involving q. This counterfactual second-order judgment is a relevant alter-
native to the actual second-order judgment involving p, given that I could 
have witnessed U2 instead of U1, and thus that I could have had the thought 
with the content q instead of the thought with the content p.  
 Nevertheless, it is natural to assume that I cannot discriminate a priori 
the contents of the two second-order introspective judgments. Compare the 
above-mentioned UFO example with the original version of the story where 
I witness the movements of the two aircrafts one after the other, mistakenly 
believing that they are one and the same. In the original version, imagine 
that, at each of my observations, I make the second-order introspective 
judgment, ‘I am thinking that that moves fast.’ Since I did not know that 
the aircrafts are not identical, I would think that I made the same judgment 
twice (or so we could stipulate the story). If I am asked, I would sincerely 
report that the content of the judgment I made at each time was exactly 
the same. Here, the actual situation where I make the second-order intro-
spective judgment featuring U2 does not significantly differ from the coun-
terfactual situation where I make the same second-order judgment involving 
q in the above-mentioned variation of the story. Therefore, we could  
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reasonably infer that, in the above-mentioned variation of the story as well, 
I would not be able to tell the difference between my actual second-order 
judgment involving p and the counterfactual second-order judgment involv-
ing q. Still, when I make the second-order introspective judgment in the 
actual situation, the content of my judgment involves p, and not q, since 
I make this judgment while looking at U1. Thus, it is clear that, in the 
actual situation, I think that I am thinking that p, as opposed to thinking 
that I am thinking that q. This shows that (E´) is vulnerable to a counter-
example. 
 The preceding observation shows that I can think a second-order intro-
spective thought with a demonstrative content without necessarily being 
able to discriminate it from any relevant alternative thought with a differ-
ent demonstrative content. This is in part because I indefinitely used the 
demonstrative expression in denoting the perceived object. When I think, 
‘I am thinking that that moves fast,’ my use of the demonstrative expression 
enables me to refer to the object without attaching any identificatory char-
acteristics to it. Due to this feature, I am guaranteed to be successful in 
referring to the object that I am in fact referring to. That is, my thought is 
guaranteed to be about my first-order thought with the U1 content as op-
posed to, say, the U2 content (or any other content, for that matter). I need 
not be able to distinguish the thought with the U1 content from any relevant 
alternative thought such as one with the U2 content, because when I refer 
to U1 with the indefinite use of the demonstrative, the truth condition of 
my utterance does not require that I successfully refer to U1. 
 Furthermore, I want to claim that, in the above-mentioned variation of 
the UFO story, I can be said to know the content of my thought without 
having the ability to discriminate between the two introspective thoughts. 
Since I had never seen the UFO I witnessed in this incident before, when 
I think, ‘I am thinking that that moves fast,’ I would not take “that” as 
anything in particular. I would only take it to be some thing or other, just 
as I would take the peach as some peach or other in the fruit store. When 
I introspectively think, ‘I am thinking that that moves fast,’ I make a judg-
ment that I am thinking that that (U1) moves fast—i.e., I make a judgment 
that I am thinking that p. Following the Burgean approach, this judgment 
is self-verifying because, in making it, I entertain the thought that p, and 
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thus am thinking that p. I cannot falsely believe, for example, that I am 
thinking that q, because, given that I never encountered U2 before, and thus 
would not take the flying object I am currently watching as any particular 
thing, there is no ground for me to think that the content of my thought 
concerns U2. I cannot misidentify the object in the content of my thought 
as something else simply because I do not attribute any identificatory prop-
erty to the object I am witnessing. We can articulate this observation as 
follows: 
 (D) Insofar as S refers to x with the indefinite use of a demonstrative 
expression, S’s judgment that S is thinking that x is F is self-
verifying.  
 Now, suppose I am a devoted epistemologist, and (D) is the conclusion 
I reached as a result of my academic research on how demonstratives work. 
For this reason, let us stipulate, I was ready to resort to (D) when I wit-
nessed the UFO incident. If (D) is correct, then when I see the aircraft and 
think, ‘I am thinking that that moves fast,’ I judge that I am thinking that 
that (U1) moves fast—i.e., I judge that I am thinking that p. This judgment 
is true and self-verifying, and by virtue of knowing (D), I am entitled to 
know the truth and the self-verifiability of my judgment. Thus, I can justi-
fiably claim that I know that I am thinking that p, although I admittedly 
cannot discriminate a priori between my actual occurrent thought with the 
content p and a thought with a relevant alternative content such as q. Thus, 
the UFO story constitutes a counterexample to (DA2′). 
 Here my knowledge about the content of my occurrent thought partly 
depends on my understanding of how the demonstrative works in the state-
ment expressing my thought. Since I am aware of (D), in judging that I am 
thinking that that moves fast, I know that what I am thinking is about 
whatever is designated by my indefinite use of the demonstrative expres-
sion. I also know that in using the demonstrative, I do not attribute any 
identificatory property to the referent. For this reason, I know that I cannot 
be mistaken in designating the referent with my use of the demonstrative 
expression. Consequently, I am entitled to know that the content of my 
thought is the very proposition containing the demonstrative, as opposed 
to an alternative proposition whose content is indistinguishable to me. In 
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other words, when I know (D), if I judge that I am thinking that p, then 
I know what I am thinking is the content p, as opposed to the content q, 
where p and q are distinct but nonetheless indistinguishable contents to me. 
This line of reasoning can be suitably extended to accommodate the skep-
tical view about content externalism involving the slow switch example. 
Suppose, in the aforementioned slow switch case, Sally is a prominent 
Burgean scholar who is well aware of the self-verifying nature of basic self-
knowledge. She would know that she cannot possibly misidentify the refer-
ent of ‘water’ in uttering the word, whether her current aquatic environ-
ments involve water-thoughts or twater-thoughts. Then, when she thinks, ‘I 
am thinking that water is wet,’ she knows that she cannot be mistaken about 
the content of her first-order thought. This is because she knows that there 
is no possible way she could mistakenly judge that she is thinking that water 
is wet, when she in fact judges that she is thinking that twater is wet in the 
twater-environments. Likewise, she knows that there is no possible way she 
could falsely judge that she is thinking that twater is wet when she in fact 
judges that she is thinking that water is wet in the water-environments. 
However, she cannot ex hypothesi discriminate between the water-thoughts 
and the corresponding twater-thoughts. Once again, (DA2′) is falsified.11 
 This completes my argument against the discrimination argument. 
I now turn to a possible objection to the key idea of my argument, and 
attempt to defend my argument against it. 
4. Demonstrative thoughts and immunity of error  
through misidentification 
 The core of my argument lies in the proposition that while thinking 
a thought where we demonstratively refer to an object without attributing 
any identificatory property to it, we cannot possibly misidentify it.12 Along 
                                                 
11  I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for Organon F for pressing me to clarify 
the discussion in this paragraph. 
12  In particular, my argument involves the impossibility of misidentification in se-
cond-order demonstrative thoughts. However, here the impossibility of misidentifi-
cation ultimately resorts to the impossibility of misidentification in a typical case of 
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this line of thought, in the preceding UFO example, when I look at the 
unidentified aircraft and think, ‘That moves fast,’ there is simply no room 
for me to misidentify the object, given that I do not take the aircraft as 
some particular object.13 To use philosophical jargon, my thought (or judg-
ment) may be said to be “immune to error through misidentification” 
(IETM, henceforth). 
 To reject my argument, defenders of the discrimination argument may 
argue that judgments that demonstratively denote an object are not neces-
sarily IETM. The following example by Sydney Shoemaker may illuminate 
their purpose. 
Suppose that I am selling neckties, that a customer wants a red 
necktie, and that I believe I have put a particular red silk necktie 
on a shelf of the showcase that is visible to the customer but not 
to me. Putting my hand on a necktie on that shelf, and feeling it 
to be silk, I might say “This one is red.” (Shoemaker 1968, 558) 
Shoemaker points out that, in this case, there is a disparity between the 
intended reference and the actual reference. When the subject utters, “This 
one is red,” he intends to refer to the necktie he believes he put on the shelf 
earlier, while it is possible that the intended object is not identical to the 
object he is in fact referring to. So, he can sensibly ask himself, ‘There is 
some red silk necktie on the shelf, but is it this one?’ In other words, in 
making the utterance “This one is red,” he can possibly make the following 
inference: “x = the necktie that I put on the shelf; the necktie that I put on 
the shelf was red; thus, x is red.” It might be argued that the fact that this 
sort of inference is possible indicates the disparity. According to this objec-
tion, since this inference clearly involves the identification of the intended 
reference and the actual reference, surely there is room for misidentification. 
Consequently, the subject’s utterance is not IETM. 
                                                 
the indefinite use of first-order demonstrative thoughts. For this reason, in this 
section I will only discuss more plain cases of such impossibility that do not involve 
the second-order thoughts. However, the discussion in this section can faithfully be 
applied to the corresponding second-order demonstrative thoughts as well. 
13  Here, I stipulate that what I am seeing does exist—i.e., I disregard the possibili-
ties that I am daydreaming, hallucinating, and so on. 
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 I think that compatibilists can give at least two answers in response to 
this objection. First, they may question whether there really is a disparity 
between the intended reference and the actual reference in Shoemaker’s 
example. Instead, they can say that there may be two different senses of 
intended reference. Shoemaker speaks of the disparity because the subject 
intends to refer to the necktie he believes he put on the shelf earlier, but 
what he actually refers to may not be that necktie. However, it is also 
correct to say that in uttering “This one is red,” the subject intends to refer 
to the object he is currently touching, and what he is touching is what he 
is actually referring to at that moment. Thus, the intention of the subject 
is doubled in this case: he intends to refer to the necktie which he believes 
he put on the shelf earlier, but at the same time, he intends to refer to the 
object with which he is currently in tactual contact. We may call the two 
senses of his intentions descriptive and non-descriptive intentions. In this 
example, the subject descriptively intends to refer to the necktie he believes 
he put on the shelf earlier, in the sense that what he intends to refer to is 
the object that exactly fits the description at hand (namely, “the necktie 
he believes he put on the shelf earlier”). On the other hand, he non-descrip-
tively intends to refer to what he is currently touching because in this case 
it is not by virtue of fitting the description that he successfully refers to the 
intended object: the description does not play any role in his denoting the 
referent. Speaking of non-descriptive intentions, there is no disparity be-
tween the actual and the intended references in Shoemaker’s example, since 
he wishes to refer to the necktie that he is currently in tactual contact with, 
and he successfully refers to it. 
 Note that it is non-descriptive intention that is pertinent to my argu-
ment against the discrimination argument. My argument appeals to the 
indefinite use of demonstratives, where the subject’s demonstrative expres-
sion denotes the object without recourse to any descriptive characteriza-
tions. For instance, in the original UFO story, when I look at the UFO and 
think that that moves fast, I do not refer to the aircraft by attributing any 
description to it, such as “the shiny flying saucer with irregular patterns.” 
I simply refer to the visually perceived object as “that.” By contrast, the 
subject of Shoemaker’s example takes the intended object as some particular 
thing: he takes the necktie he is currently touching as the one which he had 
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put on the shelf earlier. However, this does not entail that there is room for 
him to misidentify the object. Suppose it turns out that the necktie he is 
currently touching is actually not the one he put on the shelf earlier. When 
the subject utters, “This one is red,” he does not intend to refer to the 
object he believes he put on the shelf earlier no matter what that object is. 
Rather, he intends to refer to the object with which he is in contact, falsely 
believing it is the necktie he put on the shelf earlier. Hence, what he is doing 
is ascribing such-and-such property to the object with which he has a per-
ceptual contact, as opposed to (mis)identifying the object with which he is 
in contact with the object he characterizes with a certain description. As 
a result, opponents of my argument are misguided in saying that, in Shoe-
maker’s example, the judgment of the subject is not IETM. His judgment 
may be erroneous: however, if there is an error in his judgment, it would 
not be due to misidentification; rather it would be due to misattribution, 
because in that case he would be attributing a wrong property to the cor-
rectly-identified object.14 This consideration reveals that Shoemaker’s ex-
ample does no harm to my argument. 
 Second, even if we grant that not all uses of demonstratives are IETM, 
certain uses of demonstratives are; and as a canonical case of perceptual 
demonstrative use, the demonstrative expression used in my argument is 
IETM. In his discussion on self-reference, Shoemaker (1968, 558) compares 
the case quoted above with a plain case where the subject points to a red 
necktie he is seeing and says, “This is red.” He acknowledges that in the 
latter, unlike the former, the subject does not identify the object as some 
particular thing, and thus there is no room for misidentification. Here we 
may sensibly ask what causes the difference between the two cases. Why is 
it that the subject’s utterance in the latter is IETM while the same utter-
ance in the former is not? In my view, this is because, in making the utter-
ance in the latter, unlike the former, the subject has a perceptual contact 
                                                 
14  Similarly, in the slow switch case, Sally can be mistaken if she thinks on Twin 
Earth, ‘I am thinking that water is composed of H2O.’ However, in that case, the 
error occurs because she misattributes the property of her thought: it is not due to 
misidentification. In fact, Sally would need to accurately represent her first-order 
thought in order to misattribute a property to it at all. I am indebted to an anony-
mous reviewer for Organon F for this point. 
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with the object in the relevant way. This is not to say that the subject in 
the former is not in any way perceptually in contact with the object, since 
he is clearly in contact with the object tactually. However, the tactual con-
tact is not pertinent to his judging the object as a red one—it may only be 
relevant to judging it as a silky one. When making a perceptual judgment, 
to judge that an object has certain color, the subject is required to have 
visual contact with the object. Touching the necktie is simply irrelevant to 
telling its color—though, again, it may be relevant to making a judgment 
about its texture. In this sense, the subject in the former case fails to have 
the relevant type of perceptual contact with the object. On the other hand, 
the subject in the latter case has visual contact with the object, and this 
perceptual contact is relevant to his judgment of the object as being red. 
From this observation, I contend that a demonstrative judgment is IETM 
if the subject is in the relevant type of perceptual contact with the object 
in making the judgment, even if not all demonstrative judgments are 
IETM.15 
 Let us now reconsider the UFO example. We can easily note that I am 
in the right sort of perceptual contact with the aircraft when I make the 
judgment that that moves fast, given that I make this judgment on the 
basis of my visual experiences. For instance, I may make this judgment 
based on how fast it looks. As a standard case where we use a demonstrative 
to denote a perceptually recognized object, this example is analogous to the 
case where the subject simply looks at a red necktie and says, “This is red.” 
Hence, in making the judgment about the UFO, my use of the demonstra-
tive expression is IETM, whether or not all demonstrative thoughts are 
IETM. 
                                                 
15  In fact, we might argue that it is not surprising that not all demonstrative uses 
are IETM. It is well-known that Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958, 66–67) once distinguis-
hed two uses of the term ‘I’: ‘I’ as subject use and ‘I’ as object use. Among them, it 
is widely accepted that ‘I’ as subject use is IETM. It may be argued that the uses of 
demonstrative terms can be divided in a similar way: the ones that involve the 
judgment of which the subject has the right sort of perceptual contact with the 
object, and the ones that do not. In my view, the former is IETM while the latter 
may not. 
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5. Conclusion 
 It is widely held that knowledge requires some sort of discriminability. 
We may call this requirement the discriminability thesis. The discrimina-
bility thesis gives rise to the skeptical view that content externalism is in-
compatible with self-knowledge of our own thought content. This skepticism 
is embodied by the discrimination argument, which claims that knowledge 
of our own thought requires the ability to discriminate between our occur-
rent thought content and any relevant alternative contents. In this paper, 
I argued that understanding the nature of the indefinite use of a demon-
strative helps us to see that the discriminability thesis does not apply to 
self-knowledge. In my view, when we demonstratively denote an object 
without taking it as anything in particular, our second-order judgment 
about our own thinking, whose content includes the indefinite use of 
a demonstrative, constitutes knowledge without due discriminability, 
thereby making a case against the discriminability thesis in terms of our 
own thoughts. I also showed that this approach can be faithfully applied to 
handle the skeptical view that references the slow switch case. Given the 
wide acceptance of the discriminability thesis, my argument is worth noting. 
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